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Abstract
The paper presents and tests a theory of the demand for money
that is derived from a general equilibrium, endogenous growth econ-
omy, which in e¤ect combines a special case of the shopping time
exchange economy with the cash-in-advance framework. The model
predicts that both higher ination and nancial innovation - that re-
duces the cost of credit - induce agents to substitute away from money
towards exchange credit. The implied interest elasticity of money de-
mand rises with the ination rate and nancial innovation rather than
being constant as is typical in shopping time specications. Using
quarterly data for the US and Australia, we nd evidence of cointe-
gration for the money demand model. This money demand stability
results because of the extra series that capture nancial innovation;
included are robustness checks and comparison to a standard money
demand specication.
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1 Introduction
The paper o¤ers a test of the money demand function, as derived from a
general equilibrium endogenous growth model that includes nancial sector
productivity (Gillman and Kejak 2005b). This model explains ination as
having a negative but diminishing e¤ect on growth as the ination rate is
raised. Underlying the result is that the consumer becomes increasingly
sensitive to ination, as this tax is increased, substituting more from money
to credit, and less from goods to leisure. Since the human capital utilization
rate decreases as leisure use increases, the growth rate falls, but falls by
lesser amounts as ination increases. The implied money demand function is
similar to a Cagan (1956) function, with a constant semi-interestelasticity,
or rather an elasticity that rises in magnitude as the ination rate rises.
An additional feature of the money demand is that its interest elasticity
also rises with productivity increases in the credit production sector that
outstrip aggregate productivity increases that are reected in the real wage.
This means that during a period of nancial deregulation, as occurred in the
US and Australia, starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the interest elas-
ticity ceteris paribus would be expected to rise in magnitude due to the less
expensive credit that acted as an alternative means of exchange. Decreases in
the nominal interest rates that occurred during the later part of the deregu-
latory period, due to falling ination, would cause by themselves the interest
elasticity to decrease in magnitude. The net e¤ect of these two opposing
factors in a sense can be hinted at by what happened to velocity during this
period. For example for the US, the income velocity of money continued to
rise even after the fall in nominal interest rates. This is explained by the
nancial sector productivity increases dominating the nominal interest rate
decreases, in Gillman and Kejak (2004). From this velocity experience, then,
it would be expected that the interest elasticity would rise over the period.
This gives two central hypotheses for the paper. One, that a stable money
demand function can be found for the Cagan-like model that also explains
the ination-growth prole (Gillman and Kejak 2005b), as based on the
inclusion of an additional variable, reecting nancial sector productivity,
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as compared to standard money demand models. Second, that the interest
elasticity as estimated would be found to rise over the period because of
the importance of the post-deregulation productivity in nancial services.
Note that the deregulation generally took place in phases, with a series of
banking laws that each contributed productivity shocks Benk, Gillman, and
Kejak (2005). Thus the nancial productivity variable would be expected to
reect these increases over a period of time, thereby a¤ecting the stationary
estimation rather than being conned to a jump that could be netted out of
the estimation using various procedures.
In the next Section 2, the general equilibrium the money demand is pre-
sented and a testable model is derived. The data to be used in the study
are described in Section 3. Section 4 provides empirical results for US and
Australian money demand. Section 5 presents a discussion of the results and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Representative Agent Economy
Consider a representative agent who as consumer likes goods ct and leisure
xt; and has a current period utility function given by
u = ln ct +  lnxt: (1)
The consumer can purchase the good using either money, denoted byMt,
or with exchange-credit. Letting at denote the fraction of purchases of the
aggregate consumption good that the agent chooses to make with money,
and with Pt as the goods nominal price, the cash-in-advance, or exchange
technology, constraint is
Mt = atctPt: (2)
It is apparent that the model predicts a unitary consumption elasticity and
a (variable) consumption velocity of money equal to 1=at. Total exchange is
equal to both money and credit purchases of the consumption goods. With
qt denoting the real quantity of credit used, the exchange constraint can be
expressed as
Mt + Ptqt = Ptct; (3)
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and combining equations (2) and (3),
qt = (1  at) ct: (4)
The fraction of time spent in each activity sums to one. With lGt; lFt;
and lHt denoting the time spent in goods production, credit production, and
human capital investment production, respectively,
1 = xt + lt + lFt + lHt: (5)
Credit services are produced using only e¤ective labour and total de-
posited funds, a constant returns to scale (CRS) function that follows the
standard banking literature begun with the seminal contributions of Clark
(1984) and Hancock (1985), except that there is no physical capital as an
input, for simplication.1 The total funds deposited, if the nancial interme-
diary is decentralized, are the money and credit given in equation (3); the
deposited funds are set equal to ct:2 With lFtht the total banking time of the
agent, and with AF 2 R+, the CRS credit services production technology is
given as
qt = AF (lFtht)
c1 t : (6)
Solving for at in equations (4) and (6), and substituting this into the
exchange constraint (2), the money constraint can be written in a way that
includes the credit production technology:3
Mt = [1  AF (lFtht=ct)]Ptct: (7)
This version of the Clower constraint can be shown to be equivalent to a
special case of the shopping time constraint, if the e¤ective banking time
1See Gillman and Kejak (2005a) for specications with capital.
2Gillman, Harris, and Kejak (2006) present the decentralization with the deposit struc-
ture fully set out, with the full non-interest bearing and interest-bearing deposits that
underlie the exchange.
3This version of the Clower constraint can be shown to be equivalent to a special case
of the shopping time constraint, if the e¤ective banking time lFtht is solved for; then this
banking time rises with ct;and falls with Mt=Pt; just as does shopping time. But whereas
in the typical shopping time specication, the interest elasticity is constant by design,
here in contrast the CRS production function for credit crucially implies a money demand
interest elasticity that rises in magnitude with the ination rate.
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lFtht is solved for; then this banking time rises with ct;and falls with Mt=Pt;
just as does shopping time. But whereas in the typical shopping time spec-
ication, the interest elasticity is constant by design, here in contrast the
CRS production function for credit crucially implies an equilibrium money
demand interest elasticity that rises in magnitude with the ination rate.
The consumer accumulates both human capital ht and physical capital kt;
renting both to the goods producer. The rate of human capital investment
is assumed to be proportional to the e¤ective time spent in human capital
accumulation lHtht, as in Lucas (1988). WithAH 2 R++ and the depreciation
rate h;
_ht = AH lHtht   hht: (8)
Physical capital investment it; given the depreciation rate k; is given by
_kt = it   kkt: (9)
The nominal value of the nancial capital stock, denoted by Qt; equals the
sum of the money stock and the nominal value of the physical capital stock.
It is given by
Qt =Mt + Ptkt; (10)
making the ow of nominal nancial wealth:
_Qt = _Mt + Pt _kt + _Ptkt: (11)
With investment equal to income minus consumption, or Ptit = rtPtkt +
wtPtltht   Ptct; and with substitution from equations (9) and (11), the ow
constraint (11)can be written as
_Qt = rtPtkt + wtPtltht   Ptct + _Mt + _Ptkt: (12)
2.1 Goods Producer Problem
Goods are produced, by the representative agent acting as a producer, with
a Cobb-Douglas technology involving physical capital, denoted by kt, and ef-
fective labour, which equals the human capital stock, denoted by ht, factored
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by the fraction of time spent in goods production. With AG 2 R++ a shift
parameter,  2 (0; 1); and yt denoting the total output of goods that can be
converted costlessly to capital, production of goods is given by
yt = AG (ltht)
 k1 t : (13)
The rm maximizes the standard prot subject to rental capital and labor
inputs, with the rst-order conditions that
w = AG (ltht)
 1 k1 t ; (14)
r = (1  )AG (ltht) k t : (15)
2.2 Government
It is assumed that the government supplies money through lump sum trans-
fers Vt to the agent,
_Mt = Vt; (16)
where Vt = Mt; so that the rate of money growth is constant at .
2.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is characterized by the rms conditions (14) and (15), the money
supply condition (16), and the consumers equilibrium conditions from the
following Hamiltonian problem: the consumer maximizes the present value
of utility given by (1) subject to the constraints (7), (8), (10) and (12) with
respect to ct; xt; lt; lFt; ht; kt; and Mt :
H = e t (ln ct +  lnxt) (17)
+t fMt   [1  AF (lFtht=ct)]Ptctg
+'t (Qt  Mt   Ptkt)
+t

rtPtkt + wtPtltht   Ptct + Vt + _Ptkt

+t [AH (1  xt   lt   lFt)ht   hht] :
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2.4 Balanced Growth Path
The agents equilibrium conditions along the balanced growth path can be
expressed, with the time subscripts dropped, with g denoting the balanced-
path growth rate, and with R denoting the nominal interest rate (made
explicitly the interest rate for nominal bonds, if bonds are included in the
problem), as
x
c
=
1 + aR +  (1  a)R
wh
; (18)
g = r   K   ; (19)
  _t=t = AH (1  x)  H = r   K ; (20)
  _t=t = r + _P=P  R; (21)
w = AG [AH (1  x) = (1  )] (1 )= ; (22)
R = w=

AF (lFh=c)
 1 : (23)
The rst equilibrium equation (18) describes substitution between goods
c and leisure x, as being dependent on the real wage w as discounted the by
nominal interest rate R, whereby the discount is smaller the greater is the use
of credit (a larger 1 a ); put di¤erently, a rise in R causes substitution from
goods to leisure. The second condition (19) gives the balanced growth rate g
as being equal to the return on physical capital r  K minus time preference
, as well as equaling, by the third equation (20), the return on human capital
minus time preference ; human capitals utilization rate (1  x) goes down,
and the growth rate goes down, when leisure x goes up because of ination.
Equation (21) presents a form of the Fisher equation of interest rates, by
which the real interest rate and the ination rate sum up to the nominal
interest rate; while equation (22) from the producer problem shows that the
real wage rises with an increase in leisure when ination increases.
2.4.1 Money Demand
Equations (22) and (23) describe the standard input price relations in the
goods and credit service sectors, with the price of labor equaling its marginal
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product in (22), and with the marginal cost of credit equaling the ratio of
the marginal factor price w to the marginal factor product AF (lFh=c)
 1 in
(23). From this latter equation, and the exchange constraint (7), the agents
real money demand can be derived as
M=P = m =
"
1 

R
w
=(1 )
A
1=(1 )
F
#
c: (24)
Writing money demand in terms of its inverse income velocity,
m=y =
"
1 

R
w
=(1 )
A
1=(1 )
F
#
(c=y) : (25)
The solution for c=y follows from c=y = 1   (i=y) = 1  

_kt + Kkt

=y =
_k=k + K

(k=y) = 1   [(g + K)  (k=y)]. Since k=y is the inverse of the
average product of capital in the Cobb-Douglas production of goods, k=y =
(1  ) =r. Using this relation and substituting in for g from equation (19)
gives that c=y =  + (=r) (1  ) ; so that
m=y =
"
1 

R
w
=(1 )
A
1=(1 )
F
#
[ + (=r) (1  )] : (26)
The money demand per output depends negatively on the nominal inter-
est rate R, positively on the real wage w [as in Karni (1974), Dowd (1990),
and Goodfriend (1997)], and negatively on the level of productivity in the
credit sector AF . Although nancial innovation has been considered as a fac-
tor of money demand in various ways, for example in Friedman and Schwartz
(1982), Orden and Fisher (1993), and Collins and Anderson (1998), the inclu-
sion of AF is more novel as a time series variable. An increase in AF increases
the productivity of credit services and so decreases the demand for real money
balances. The parameter  determines the degree of diminishing returns to
e¤ective labor per unit of consumption in the credit sector; Gillman, Har-
ris, and Kejak (2006) interpret this parameter within a decentralized credit
sector as indicating the degree of the economies of scale in producing credit,
a measure of development that changes only gradually over long periods of
time. This is treated as a constant for the money demand estimation.
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2.4.2 Interest Elasticity
From equations (2) and (26), the interest elasticity of m=y; denoted by m=yR ;
is

m=y
R =  


1  

1  a
a

=  


1  
  R
w
=(1 )
A
1=(1 )
F
1   R
w
=(1 )
A
1=(1 )
F
!
:
It is immediately clear that @ j m=yR j =@R > 0; given the Fisher equation
(21), this implies that the elasticity increases as ination goes up. Increases
in credit productivity, AF ; similarly increase the elasticity magnitude.
2.5 Basis for Testing
The nature of the interest elasticity will be tested by an approximation to the
money demand in (26). The second factor in equation (26), [ + (=r) (1  )] ;
which depends on the real interest rate, will be assumed to be constant. This
assumption e¤ectively is ignoring cyclical income e¤ects on inverse income
velocity coming through changes in consumption relative to income as a re-
sult of temporary income e¤ects.4 Here, with an emphasis on the trends in
the interest elasticity over time, the assumption that this term is constant
implies that temporary income e¤ects are absent, as is consistent with the
models deterministic setting.5
4Such changes are possible and dealt with in Friedman (1959), Friedman and Schwartz
(1963), and Benk, Gillman, and Kejak (2006), in which an increase in temporary income
causes an increase in velocity in a procyclic fashion; and this is investigated econometrically
in Gillman, Siklos, and Silver (1997).
5Note that other major dimensions of this model have been tested. Gillman and Nakov
(2004) nd support for the implied general equilibrium Tobin e¤ect, whereby ination
causes the capital to e¤ective labor ratios across sectors to rise, because of a higher input
price ratio of w=r; Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004) nd support for the negative e¤ect
of ination on growth.
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3 Econometric Model Specication
Applying the approximation (1   z) =   ln z to equation (26), a more
tractable form for estimation is
m=y =  B f[= (1  )] (1 + lnR  lnw) + (1=) lnAFg (27)
where B  [ + (=r) (1  )]  1; for g  0; is treated as a constant.
3.1 Baseline Money Demand Specication
From the equilibrium money demand approximation in equation (27), the
model for estimation can be directly expressed as
(mt=yt) = 0 + 1 lnRt + 2 lnwt + 3 lnAFt + u1t; (28)
u1t is assumed to be a stationary error term, which reects dynamic adjust-
ment, measurement errors and (stationary) omitted variables. The compar-
ative statics of equation (27) impose the following general sign restrictions
on the parameters for the variables in (28):
1 < 0; 2 > 0; 3 < 0: (29)
Equation (27) and the Cobb-Douglas specication for the credit production
imply the additional variable restrictions that
 1 = 2 = = (1  ) ; 3 = (1=)2;  < 1: (30)
3.2 Alternative Standard Money Demand Specica-
tion
As an alternative to equation (28) we also consider a standard constant
interest elasticity model for money demand:
ln(mt=yt) = 0 + 1 ln it + 2 ln yt + u2t: (31)
This is similar to the form estimated by Ho¤man, Rasche, and Tieslau (1995),
except that for comparability with (28) our dependent variable is inverse
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velocity. From standard theory we expect 1 < 0, as it measures the interest
elasticity of money demand, while the magnitude and sign of 2 is ambiguous
as it depends on whether the income elasticity of money demand is greater
or less than one. A unitary income elasticity (as implied by the exchange
credit model) makes 2 = 0, while an income elasticity, for example, of less
than one makes 2 negative.
The key feature of this conventional specication is that it does not allow
for the e¤ect of changes in the cost of exchange credit on the demand for
money. If for example the 1980s and 1990s represent a period during which
the relative price of exchange credit fell sharply, due to the e¤ects of deregu-
lation and rapid technological progress in the nancial sector, then according
to the banking time model, the conventional specication should not be an
adequate model of the demand for cash.
4 Data
A quarterly data set is constructed for the United States from 1976:1 to
1998:2 and for Australia from 1975:1 to 1996:2. These are periods when
both of these countries experienced relatively high ination, deregulation of
the nancial system and the growth of interest bearing exchange credit. The
majority of series used in the paper are produced by government departments
and o¢ cial statistical agencies. However for some series we are forced to
extrapolate or interpolate the available data. Denitions of the series used
are provided in the Appendix A, while the full data set and the primary
sources are available from the authors on request.
Two comments about the variables used in the paper are in order. In
the theoretical model, money is a non-interest bearing means of payment
that is costless to produce. Therefore in the empirical analysis we use a
narrower monetary aggregate than M1 or M2, both of which have been widely
used in previous empirical studies. These monetary aggregates include assets
that we consider more like credit than our models concept of money. The
model suggests the use of a narrow monetary aggregate, which we measure
as currency plus non-interest bearing bank deposits.
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One problem that we face in estimating equation (28) for Australia is
the lack of a useful measure of labour productivity in the nance sector.
In Australia the o¢ cial measure of aggregate output in the nance sector
aggregate is obtained adding the value of inputs and assuming a zero growth
rate for labour productivity. In the absence of a direct productivity measure
for the Australian nance sector we use the real wage for that sector as a
proxy. Provided factor markets are reasonably competitive, changes in the
real wage will reect productivity changes. It is apparent from equation (6)
that the marginal product of labour in credit production depends on AF .
Lowe (1995) provides some empirical evidence, which suggests that the real
wage in the Australian nancial sector is a plausible indicator of productivity
in that sector.
5 Results
The two models that we consider are given by equations (28) and (31). We
view these models as alternative equilibrium relationships that potentially
describe the long-run inuences on money holdings. It is apparent from
looking at plots of the variables that the series are non-stationary. Moreover
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root implies that it is not unrea-
sonable to characterise the variables in the two models as integrated of order
one. Given the non-stationary nature of the data, our econometric strategy is
to employ the cointegration techniques developed by Johansen and Juselius
(1990) and Johansen (1995) to estimate the two alternative models.
5.1 Baseline Model
Tables 1 and 2 present the results for United States and Australian data
obtained from estimation of the banking time model using the Johansen
procedure. The results for both countries are based on a VAR in levels
with four lags, however (as indicated below) our results are not particularly
sensitive to choice of lag length . The trace and the -max statistics are used
to test for the number of cointegrating vectors. Using a 5 percent level of
signicance the trace test points to a single cointegrating relationship among
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the four variables in the banking time model for both the United States and
Australian data. The -max test is consistent with this nding for Australia,
but provides slightly weaker support for a cointegrating vector for the United
States (about the 10 percent level). However, on balance there seems to be
reasonable evidence of a cointegrating relationship among the four variables
in the banking time model for both countries.
Conditional on the existence of a single cointegrating vector we normalize
by setting the coe¢ cient on m=y equal to unity and then interpret the other
coe¢ cient estimates in the vector as the long-run coe¢ cients in equation
(28). The unrestricted point estimates of the  coe¢ cients along with 95
percent condence intervals are reported in the tables. For both countries the
signs of the unrestricted point estimates are consistent with the predictions
of the model. Equilibrium holdings of money are negatively related to the
nominal interest rate and to productivity in the credit sector, while they are
positively related to the aggregate real wage rate. However one problem with
the unrestricted estimates for both countries is that the estimated standard
errors are large. This can be seen from the reported 95 percent condence
intervals, which typically include zero.
5.1.1 Restrictions
More precise estimates can be obtained by imposing the restriction on the
cointegrating vector that
 1 = 2: (32)
A likelihood ratio test indicates that this restriction is not rejected by the
data for either country and the respective restricted estimates are reported
in Tables 1 and 2. For Australia the coe¢ cient estimates for the restricted
model are all statistically signicant. From equation (30), j1j = 2 =
= (1  ) ; and the implied point estimate of  is 0.26. For the United States
data imposing the restriction reduces the coverage of the 95 percent interval
estimate, but all intervals still include zero. The implied point estimate on
the interest rate and real wage is =0.21. The point estimates of for both
countries provide strong empirical support for the assumption of decreasing
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marginal returns to time spent in credit production.6
The estimated coe¢ cients on the measure of productivity in the credit
sector are negative for both sets of data. This is consistent with models
prediction that productivity improvements in the credit sector will lower the
price of credit (as a means of exchange) and result in substitution away from
cash. One di¤erence between the point estimates for the United States and
Australia is the absolute magnitude of the coe¢ cients. In fact the results
for Australia provide greater support for our particular parameterization of
the banking time model than those for the United States. Since equation
(30) implies that 3 =   [1= (1  )] ; another estimate of  can be recovered
from the point estimate of 3. For Australia the implied value of  is 0.66,
which is within the (0; 1) assumed bounds; however for the United States
the implied value for  is negative, which violates the bounds. This forces
reliance only upon the estimate of  as given by the 1 and 2 joint estimate.
5.1.2 Interest Elasticity Estimate
From equation (28) it is apparent that the (approximate) interest elastic-
ity implied by our specication of the banking time model is given by -
[= (1  )] (m=y). Thus the interest elasticity of money is time varying and
given the time series properties of m=y is actually non-stationary. Figure 1
presents a plot of the interest elasticity for the United States and Australia
implied by the restricted estimates. In both countries the demand for money
has tended to become more elastic over time.
The results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the baseline model is able
to capture key aspects of the long run behaviour of the non-interest bearing
6Gillman, Harris, and Kejak (2006) show that  is equal to the interest di¤erential
between the government bond rate and the depositor interest rate; since this di¤erential
equals the per unit cost of producing the credit,  = 0:21 can be interpreted as this per
unit cost, ie. the fraction of interest earnings used up in the cost of the credit production.
However note that the qualication of equation (27), that B is multiplied by : With
 = 0:6 as in a typical calibration, and with a growth rate of g = 0:03; and  = 0:03; then
r = 0:06; B  [ + (=r) (1  )] = [0:6 + 0:5(0:4)] = 0:8; and the actual measure of ,
say ^; would be (0.8)(0.26)=0.208 for Australia, and (0.8)(0.21)=0.168 for the US. This
0.168 compares rather well to a calibration in Gillman, Harris, and Kejak (2006) of 0.133,
based on industry costs in supplying exchange credit.
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money in the United States and Australia. In particular, productivity growth
in exchange credit production and the consequent fall in the cost of exchange
credit services appear to be important inuences on the transactions demand
for cash.
5.2 Conventional Model
If the cost of credit services is an important determinant of the demand for
money, then a conventional money demand should not be able to explain
the trend behaviour of cash. We now examine this hypothesis formally by
estimating equation (31). This specication is equivalent to the model for
log-velocity that has been estimated by Ho¤man, Rasche, and Tieslau (1995)
for a number of countries. The results obtained are reported in Tables 3 and
4.
For the United States both the trace and the -max test point to the
existence of a single cointegrating vector, however the estimated long run
interest elasticity is positive. The Australian results provide even less support
for the conventional model, since there is strong evidence that the velocity
of money is not cointegrated with real income and the nominal interest rate.
What these results indicate is that real income and nominal interest rates are
not su¢ cient to explain the trend behaviour of money in the United States
and Australia over the last twenty-ve years.
6 Robustness
6.1 Sensitivity of the Estimates of the Baseline Model
While the results reported in Tables 1 and 2 provide prima facie support
for the predictions of the banking time model it is important to provide some
evidence of the robustness of our estimates. To do this we consider how the
results obtained from estimating equation (28) change as we vary rst the
sample size and then the number of lags of the VARmodel (Ho¤man, Rasche,
and Tieslau 1995). Tables 5 and 6 present some recursive estimates for equa-
tion (28). These are obtained by xing the starting point of the sample and
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then estimating the model over progressively longer sample periods. Each
set of estimates adds an extra four quarters. All of the recursive estimates
are based on VAR with four lags.
For each of the recursive estimates we report the trace statistic for
testing the null of no cointegration, the unrestricted estimates of (28), the
likelihood ratio statistic for testing  1 = 2; and the restricted estimates.
The results suggest that there is strong evidence of at least one cointegrating
vector for all of the sample lengths considered. In addition the parameter es-
timates, particularly the restricted estimates, are quite robust to the changes
in the sample size considered, particularly for the Australian data. In the
restricted model for Australia the point estimate of  varies from 0.22 to
0.26, while the estimate of ranges from -3.39 to -1.53. Overall these recursive
estimates suggest that our theory yields a relatively stable model for money
in Australia. With the United States data there is somewhat more variation
in both the restricted and unrestricted estimates, until about 1995.
Finally we consider the sensitivity of our estimates of () to changing
the lag length of the VAR model used in the Johansen estimator. Table 7
presents a comparison of the results obtained from estimation of equation
(28) for VAR models with lags lengths of 3, 4 and 5. The results for the
United States are quite robust to this variation in lag length. For Australia
with the VAR(3) and VAR(5) specications there is considerably less support
for a cointegrating relationship, although the coe¢ cient estimates obtained
from these specications are consistent with the predictions of the banking
time model and are qualitatively similar to those from the VAR(4) model.
6.2 Short Run Dynamics
The cointegration analysis is concerned with testing for long run relation-
ships and estimating the long run coe¢ cients. We now consider the short run
dynamics. Given the existence of a cointegrating relationship we can model
the dynamic behaviour of money by an error correction model. Tables 8 and
9 report our attempts to obtain a relatively parsimonious error correction
model for money. The models are obtained by the usual general-to-specic
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strategy. Initial models included two lags of the following variables: (m=y) ;
(lnw) ; (lnAF ) ; and the error correction mechanism lagged once. When
statistically insignicant variables were omitted, on the basis of t-tests, we
are left with the models reported in Tables 8 and 9. For both countries a
reasonably parsimonious dynamic model can be obtained. Diagnostic tests
on the residuals of the models indicate no evidence of serial correlation or
ARCH e¤ects up to ve lags. To ensure that our inference is robust to the
presence of heteroskedasticity, the reported t-statistics are computed using
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator.
For Australia the dynamic model explains about 75 percent of the
variation in (m=y). The signicant variables are two lags of (m=y), the
lagged change in the interest rate and the error correction term. Notice the
error correction term is the most signicant of all the variables in the dynamic
model, providing some additional evidence that the banking time model is
a valid cointegrating relationship. Lagged changes in the economy-wide real
wage and in the nance sector real wage are not important in explaining
(m=y) despite their key role in explaining the trend in non-interest bearing
money. For the United States the dynamic model explains about half the
variation in (m=y). In this case (lnAFt 1) is found to be a signicant
explanatory variable.
6.3 M1, M2, and M3 Estimation Results
As a nal test of the banking time model we estimated it using broader
some measures of money. While we have not included tables of the results
in this paper the main ndings can be summarised as follows. We estimate
the model using M1 for both the United States and Australia and using M2
for the United States and M3 for Australia. All of the measures of money
provide some support for the existence of at least one cointegrating vector.
However in the case of M1 the restriction,  1 = 2; is strongly rejected for
both countries, while the unrestricted coe¢ cient estimates typically have the
wrong signs. For the broader aggregates M2 andM3 the coe¢ cient restriction
is not rejected, but the estimated coe¢ cient on productivity is found to be
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small and statistically insignicant.
7 Discussion
In the cash-in-advance models, money is a non-interest bearing means of pay-
ment that is costless to produce. We therefore use, as our baseline aggregate
for the theory, money plus non-interest bearing demand deposits, assuming
away the cost of such deposits. In addition to this denition of money as
non-interest bearing instruments, we investigate whether the theory might
unexpectedly also explain the broader aggregates, of M1 and M2, and even
M3, but do not report the results here. These broad aggregates contain fea-
tures of both the non-interest bearing aggregates that in our model acts as
money as well as the interest-bearing aggregates that in our model acts as
exchange credit, and so are not as well-suited to being explained by stan-
dard exchange-based general equilibrium monetary models. Including the
productivity of the nance sector is expected to capture the shift away from
non-interest bearing money into interest-bearing aggregates. So it is not sur-
prising that it does not help to explain, for example, Australian M3 demand,
which includes interest-bearing aggregates. The M3 results do indicate coin-
tegration with signicance for the real wage, also a theorized cost of using
exchange credit.
Alternatively, a contrasting approach to estimating money demand is to
change the denition of the monetary aggregate so that it contains the non-
interest bearing elements of all of the monetary instruments. Barnett (1980)
does this with the Divisia application of index theory to monetary ag-
gregates, and Lucas (2000) suggests this may be a useful direction. Here
when a shift in the price of interest-bearing credit activity leads to a dif-
ferent relative usage of the various monetary instruments, the denition of
the Divisia aggregate is changed to re-weight the di¤erent instruments in
reection of their new usage. For example, a lowering of the cost of interest
bearing accounts, like checkableinterest-bearing money market accounts,
may induce an increased use of such accounts. During the moderately high-
ination and nancial-deregulation environment of the industrial countries
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in the 1980s, the Divisia index increased the weight of such partially interest-
bearing aggregates in the Divisia aggregate, while reducing the weight given
to aggregates like currency. Changing the denition of the aggregate so that
it captures the non-interest bearing parts of all of the monetary instruments
can enable the aggregate to remain responsive only to the nominal interest
rate, the own-price of money, in a stable function. It avoids a shift in its
demand during changes in the substitute prices, such as in the cost of the
interest-bearing instruments, by instead shifting the weights that dene the
aggregate.
However, central banks engaged in ination-rate targeting may need to
understand the demand for the very narrowly dened money that they actu-
ally supply and how it can shift when ination variability induces nancial
innovations. The Divisia approach provides a brilliant exposition of how the
nominal interest rate acts as the own-price of money. But it cannot explain
the demand for narrowly dened money. Dixon (1997) suggests that Barnett
(1997) makes a strong case for the Divisia approach as the only model that
can successfully provide a stable money demand based on indisputably rigor-
ous microeconomics. Our paper o¤ers up a demand for money derived from
a fairly fully specied model, including one based upon the microeconomic
structure of banking services production. Modelling the banking sector is our
key to nding a stable money demand without missing moneyand without
changing the denition of the aggregate in order to do so.
Money demand is another facet of general equilibrium models that can
be tested. If they cannot explain money demand when deregulation in the
nancial sector occurs, then they would seem to require extension so that
they can internalise such related factors within the money demand function.
This is a central argument of the paper. The paper provides a micro-founded
paradigm of banking time as a special case of shopping time, with the result
being an interest elasticity that varies signicantly with the ination rate
in a way similar to the Cagan (1956) model. And it gives less free money
demand parameters as compared to shopping time models, money-in-the-
utility function models, and cash-good, credit-good models, in the sense that
there are no unrestricted utility and transactions cost functionparameters;
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Indeed it is the attempt to restrict such free utility parameters with some
basis in outside data that has led researchers to impose a constant interest
elasticity within the shopping time framework. Such parameters here are re-
placed by only the technology parameters of the credit production function
that follows the intermediation literature of Clark (1984). By using a time
series for a measure of the productivity of the credit services sector, the esti-
mation implies an estimate of the degree of diminishing returns. This gives
an estimated technology parameter that is constant, while the behavioural
parameterof the interest elasticity is allowed to vary endogenously. Other
methods to calibrate such a parameter rather than estimate it are used in
Gillman, Harris, and Kejak (2006).
8 Conclusion
The nding of a stable money demand compares to Mark and Sul (2003), who
nd a cointegrated Cagan money demand function for individual countries
and in a panel. In contrast, is the constant interest elasticity assumption
in the exogenous growth, general equilibrium, shopping time models of, for
example, Goodfriend (1997), Lucas (2000), and Dittmar, Gavin, and Kyd-
land (2005). The di¤erence is important in that the ination-growth prole
has been shown to be replicated in general equilibrium only with a variable
interest elasticity, which rises in magnitude with the interest rate and with
productivity increases in credit supply. The rising interest elasticity, in re-
sponse to the ination tax rising, may be part of a broader phenomena of
greater price sensitivity as tax rates increase, with the results of negative
but diminishing growth e¤ects (Gillman and Kejak 2006). And such increas-
ing price elasticities also means that tax revenues, ination, labor or capital
taxes, will go up at a decreasing rate as the taxes increase, making such in-
creases less e¢ cacious. Greater ination tax sensitivity adds support to the
agenda of low ination from the growth perspective, and may help explain
the global move towards ination targeting at low levels of ination, while
seeking high-growth economic policies. As Gillman and Kejak (2005b) illus-
trate, there can be bigger increases in growth as the ination rate is knocked
19
downwards; and as extended to other taxes in Gillman and Kejak (2006), this
suggests that a low ination and low at tax regime is useful in achieving
high growth.
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A Appendix: Data Description
Money. Non-interest bearing money is measured as currency plus non-
interest bearing current deposits and M1 is the sum of currency and to-
tal current deposits. United States: Money is measured as M1 less other
checkable deposits. Australia: Data on currency holdings (not seasonally ad-
justed) are available from 1975:1. The Reserve Bank of Australia publishes
a series for total current (ie. demand) deposits with banks over the same
period, however a decomposition of this series into interest and non-interest
bearing components is only available from 1984:3 to 1996:2. An estimate of
non-interest bearing deposits for the period 1975:1 to 1984:2 is obtained by
simply extrapolating interest bearing deposits from 1984:2 back to 1975:1
(assuming a constant growth rate of 10 percent per quarter) and subtracting
these from total current deposits.
Real Income. United States: Constant price income in 1992 prices is
measured as nominal GDP deated by the price index for GDP. Australia:
Constant price income in 1989-90 prices is measured as nominal GDP deated
by the implicit price deator for GDP.
Nominal Interest Rate. United States: The interest rate is the 3 month
T-bill rate. Australia: The interest rate used is the 90 day bank-accepted
bill rate.
Economy-Wide Real Wage. United States: The economy-wide real wage
is measured as total private sector average hourly earnings in 1982 dollars.
Australia: The economy-wide hourly wage rate is obtained by dividing av-
erage weekly earnings of males in all industries by the average weekly hours
by males in all industries. This is deated by the implicit price deator for
GDP to obtain a real hourly wage rate.
Productivity in Credit Production. United States: An index of produc-
tivity in nance is computed as constant price GDP in the Finance, Insurance
and Real Estate (FIR) sector divided by total hours worked in FIR. Australia:
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In the absence of a suitable productivity measure for the credit sector, the
real wage in credit production is used as a proxy for labour productivity.
This is measured as the nominal hourly wage in the Finance and Insurance
(FI) sector. It is computed by dividing average weekly earnings in FI by
average weekly hours in FI and deating by implicit price deator for GDP.
We note that quarterly data for the average weekly earnings per employee in
FI is available only from 1984:4. For the period 1975:1 to 1984:3 we inter-
polate annual data for this series to get a quarterly series. Quarterly data
on average weekly hours is based on the numbers for the FI sub-sector from
1984:4 to 1996:2. For the earlier period 1975:4 to 1983:3 quarterly hours data
are only available for the sector the more general sector Finance, Insurance,
Property, and Business Services (FIRB). Finally for the three quarters 1975:1
to 1975:3 we interpolate from annual data for the FIPB sector.
Table 1: Banking Time Model 1976:1-1998:2 – United States
Hypothesis Trace l -max
r £ 3  0.36    0.36
r £ 2  9.84    9.48
r £ 1 24.09  14.25
r = 0 49.36*  25.27
Unrestricted Estimates: Point and 95 percent Interval Estimates
a1 a2 a3
-0.23 (-0.62 to 0.16) 0.34 (-0.48 to 1.17) -0.18 (-0.57 to -0.21)
Restriction: - =a a1 2
Likelihood Ratio Test of Restriction:
LR = 0.04
Restricted Estimates: Point and 95 percent Interval Estimates
a1 a2 a3
-0.26 (-0.63 to 0.12) 0.26 (-0.12 to  0.63) -0.22 (-0.47 to 0.04)
Notes: Critical values for the Trace and l-max test statistics are from Johansen and
Juselius (1990. Table A2).  A * indicates the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5
percent level of significance.  The LR test of the coefficient  restriction is distributed
as a Chi-squared with one degree of freedom.
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Table 2: Banking Time Model 1975:1-1996:2 – Australia
Hypothesis Trace l -max
r £ 3  1.05    1.05
r £ 2  7.59    6.54
r £ 1 18.28  10.69
r = 0 49.11*  30.83*
Unrestricted Estimates: Point and 95 percent Interval Estimates
a1 a2 a3
-0.49 (-0.93 to -0.04) 1.31 (-1.13 to 3.76) -4.30 (-8.18 to -0.42)
Restriction: - =a a1 2
Likelihood Ratio Test of Restriction:
LR = 0.75
Restricted Estimates: Point and 95 percent Interval Estimates
a1 a2 a3
-0.36 (-0.53 to -0.18) 0.36 (0.18 to 0.53) -2.98 (-4.06 to -1.89)
Notes: Critical values for the Trace and l-max test statistics are from Johansen and
Juselius (1990. Table A2).  A * indicates the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5
percent level of significance.  The LR test of the coefficient  restriction is distributed
as a Chi-squared with one degree of freedom.
Table 3: Conventional Model 1976:1-1998:2 – United States
Hypothesis Trace l -max
r £ 2  0.03   0.05
r £ 1 10.27  10.21
r = 0 30.73*  20.46*
Unrestricted Estimates: Point and 95 percent Interval Estimates
b1 b2
2.41 (-4.98 to 9.80)  1.82 (-6.01 to 9.65)
Notes: See Table 1.
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Table 4: Conventional Model 1975:1-1996:2 – Australia
Hypothesis Trace l -max
r £ 2  0.44   0.44
r £ 1  7.80   7.80
r = 0 19.06  11.25
Unrestricted Estimates: Point and 95 percent Interval Estimates
b1 b2
0.09 (-0.02 to 0.19)  1.13 (0.94 to 1.31)
Notes: See Table 1.
Table 5: Recursive Estimates of the Banking Time Model – United States
Unrestricted Estimates Restricted Estimates
Sample End Trace a1 a2 a3 LR g 3a
91:2 52.10*   0.00 1.23    0.15 6.72* 0.74  1.17
92:2 59.16* -0.01 1.14    0.10 8.93* 0.12 -0.29
93:2 50.43* -0.06 0.89    0.00 4.96* 0.09 -0.25
94:2 56.07* -0.09 0.52 -0.11 1.00 0.11 -0.25
95:2 50.58* -0.46 -3.88 -1.66 1.55 0.25 -0.22
96:2 51.71* -0.27 0.23 -0.23 0.00 0.21 -0.22
97:2 50.80* -0.26 0.17 -0.25 0.00 0.19 -0.22
98:2 49.36* -0.23 0.34 -0.18 0.04 0.20 -0.22
Notes: See Table 1.  All samples in the recursive models end in the year and quarter
indicated.
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Table 6: Recursive Estimates of the Banking Time Model – Australia
Unrestricted Estimates Restricted Estimates
Sample End Trace a1 a2 a3 LR g 3a
89:2 52.58* -0.19 -0.33    0.94 0.52 0.22 -1.55
90:2 51.54* -0.44 0.95 -2.31 1.02 0.26 -1.53
91:2 50.64* -0.55 1.76 -4.47 2.12 0.25 -2.61
92:2 50.33* -0.64 2.70 -7.07 3.04 0.24 -3.37
93:2 50.86* -0.63 2.52 -6.80 2.73 0.24 -3.39
94:2 52.61* -0.59 2.14 -5.87 2.24 0.26 -3.18
95:2 53.67* -0.59 2.14 -5.75 2.34 0.26 -3.12
96:2 49.11* -0.49 1.31 -4.30 0.75 0.26 -2.97
Notes: See Table 1.  All samples in the recursive models end in the year and quarter
indicated.
Table 7: Estimates of the Banking Time Model for Alternative Lag Lengths
Unrestricted Estimates Restricted Estimates
VAR(k) Trace a0 a1 a2 LR g a2
United States
k=3 50.33* -0.32 0.76 -0.09 0.38 0.40 -0.28
k=4 49.36* -0.23 0.34 -0.18 0.04 0.20 -0.22
k=5 47.47* -0.30   0.15 -0.24 0.08 0.21 -0.20
Australia
k=3 31.20 -0.59 1.15 -4.68 0.08 0.32 -3.67
k=4 49.11* -0.49 1.31 -4.30 0.75 0.26 -2.98
k=5 41.35 -1.46   5.24 -11.96 1.30 0.38 -4.45
Notes: See Table 1.

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Table 8: Dynamic Banking Time Model – United States
Dependent Variable: D( / )m yt t
  Unrestricted Model       Restricted Model
Constant 0.003 (1.54)  0.004 (1.63)
D( / )m yt t- -1 1  0.288 (2.49)  0.290 (2.48)
D ln it -1 -0.007 (3.87) -0.007 (3.84)
1-D FtA   0.026 (3.17)   0.026 (3.17)
ECM t -1 -0.005 (1.87) -0.005 (1.87)
R2
_
  0.484 0.483
LM1 (5)    0.114 0.112
LM2 (5)    0.515 0.530
Notes: The t-statistics are computed using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix estimator. LM1 is a Lagrange multiplier test for serial
correlation and LM2 is a test for ARCH effects.  Both allow for possible effects up to
fifth order.
Table 9: Dynamic Banking Time Model – Australia
Dependent Variable: D( / )m yt t
  Unrestricted Model       Restricted Model
Constant 0.236 (3.58) 0.260 (3.51)
D( / )m yt t- -1 1 -0.182 (2.04) -0.184 (2.04)
D( / )m yt t- -2 2 -0.295 (2.94) -0.302 (3.00)
D ln it -1 -0.010 (1.37) -0.010 (1.30)
ECM t -1 -0.026 (3.79) -0.033 (3.60)
R2
_
  0.737 0.736
LM1 (5)    0.548 0.439
LM2 (5)    0.817 0.754
Notes: The t-statistics are computed using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix estimator. LM1 is a Lagrange multiplier test for serial
correlation and LM2 is a test for ARCH effects.  Both allow for possible effects up to
fifth order.
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Estimated Interest Elasticity
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